The political experience
of the 1990s, both here and in the rest of Africa, is too well known to require
an extended treatment, however, the lessons of that experience have yet to be
sufficiently appreciated by social and political analysts in the countries
concerned. The close of the 1980s saw the emergence of what were called a "new
generation" of African leaders who promised to renounce the tradition of
authoritarian rule, and who committed themselves to responsible government and
free elections (see Ottaway 1999). Uganda, Congo, Ethiopia, Malawi, and even
Zimbabwe were included in this category. However, it was not long before these
promises were conveniently ignored, and progress towards democratic government
was stalled or altogether derailed. At present, in many of these countries, the
authoritarian tradition is once again making itself strongly felt, and there is
disregard for the rule of law, massive corruption, and lack of administrative
accountability. We shall not attempt in this short paper to examine what went
wrong and to analyze why the "democratic experiment" failed so dismally. For our
purposes, it is enough to draw one lesson, namely that for the goals of
democratization to be achieved it is not sufficient to have favorable policy
commitments on the part of government; on the contrary, the active participation
of civil society is essential.
But this is easier said than done, and in
reality the issues are much more complex than they appear on the surface. The
first question that comes to mind is: can civil society in Africa
participate effectively in the political process and is it capable enough to
promote good governance and to defend the gains that have already been achieved?
The answer to the question is by no means obvious. A robust civil society
assumes a vigorous civic tradition, but as we shall see further down, this is a
precious commodity not widely distributed in many African countries.
Nevertheless, this and similar questions shift the focus of the debate on
democratization away from the standard approach, which gives pride of place to
the state, towards social institutions and associational life. The process of
democratization in
Africa as well as in
Ethiopia has frequently been looked at from the top down. Students of the
subject have examined the prospects for democracy on the basis of formal
legislation and state interventions in the political process. Thus
constitutional provisions, the electoral process, and the practice of state
power consolidation are often the main issues that are singled out for analysis.
While analysts writing about some of the other African countries are now turning
their gaze on other subjects, in particular the role civil society can play in
promoting responsible governance, Ethiopianists have yet to make that transition.
I believe it is time to adopt a bottom-up and non-statist approach to the debate
in Ethiopia, and, it is hoped that this paper will make a modest contribution to
that endeavor.
There is currently a growing interest in civil
society in Africa among donors, international organizations and academics. The
donor community in particular is keen to promote civil society organizations in
the belief that the road to democracy in
Africa
lies not in revolutions and class struggle but
in the active involvement of such organizations in public affairs. Many see the
voluntary sector as the critical force in the battle for democratization and
good governance. According to the World Bank, for example, civil society
organizations "hold the greatest promise of success … in building and rebuilding
of state structures and institutions" (World Bank 1998: 24). Such organizations
are expected to promote political reforms, to monitor the activities of the
state and hold it accountable, and to defend the rights of citizens and the
public interest. It is believed that the 'deepening' of civil society in Africa,
both through international support and the pressure of globalization will
accelerate the pace of democratization.
There is a wide range of definitions attached
to the notion of civil society among contemporary students of the subject but it
will take us too far to review the existing literature in such a short
discussion such as this (see Dessalegn 1999). Instead I shall view civil society
in terms of a variety of autonomous, voluntary institutions which provide
services to individuals and which articulate public interests. Civil society
institutions occupy the space intermediary between the state on the one hand and
the lowest unit of social life, the family, on the other. Such institutions
place demands on the state for goods and services, promote the broad interests
of their constituencies, and help extend the social space between the state and
the individual. Civil society cannot be conceptualized outside the framework of
formal organizations; this means that it includes the organizations of the poor
and the dispossessed just as much as those of the middle classes and the
professionals. A robust civil society should protect the individual from the
overwhelming power of the state. I shall argue that the foundation for
democratic and accountable governance lies not so much in discrete civil society
institutions but rather in popular, mass-based civic movements. At present civil
society institutions in Ethiopia can play an important role in promoting public
awareness, but this is a much more limited role than securing democracy which is
what donor agencies and others expect civil society to accomplish.
Our definition of civil society excludes
informal (customary or traditional) organizations that are common in both rural
and urban areas
on the one hand, and, on the other, ethnic-based self-help and development
associations which were active during the imperial regime though under constant
scrutiny by the authorities. There is not sufficient evidence to indicate to
what extent the latter were conscious of the larger public interest or whether
they were solely concerned with undertaking their stated objectives. Such
organizations were operating under restricted conditions in the imperial period
and were closed down at the time of the Derg, so we have no way of knowing in
what direction they would have evolved and whether they would have been
concerned with larger citizens demands or with their own 'primordial' interests
had there been a more open environment. This is the main reason that in
Ethiopian circumstances the issue must remain, as it were, hanging in the air.
Be that as it may, there is considerable debate in the general literature on
whether ethnic organizations should be included as part of civil society, though
it does not appear that students of the subject will come to a consensus on the
issue soon (Kasfir: 6-8).
On the other hand, there has not been
sufficient comparative debate about informal (or customary) and formal
organizations in Ethiopia, and the differences and similarities between them,
and the ability of the former to grow into the latter. Informal organizations (idir,
iqoub, etc.) have so far been examined from what may be termed a
functional approach. They have been seen as viable institutions providing
financial services to social groups which have no access to formal savings and
credit institutions (Dejene 1993), or as useful instruments for local-level
development activity (SPADE 1997, ESSWA 1998). There is very little discussion
about the institutional capacity of the organizations, their internal
governance, and their ability to transcend their narrow objectives and
articulate public demands. Civil society organizations, on the other hand,
operate under the rule of law. They are formally organized and usually legally
registered, with specific but broad objectives, more or less participatory
internal administration, and the autonomy to act beyond the immediate interests
of their members or constituencies. Customary organizations do not meet most of
these criteria. Civic bodies have a public function beyond their specific
objectives, but this is not the case with informal institutions. I should note,
in defense of informal institutions, however, that they do play an important
role in shielding the individual and the family from the intrusions or
depredations of the state. Through the instrumentality of informal institutions
the humble individual is able to establish solidarity with his/her neighbors,
and create an alternative realm of discourse where the "public transcript" is
criticized, ridiculed or rejected (see Dessalegn 1991). Traditional structures
are resilient, much more so in many ways than formal organizations, and they are
not easily "captured" by the state, which again is not the case with formal
structures.
The voluntary sector in Ethiopia has been
growing at a rapid pace in the last six to seven years. There is today a wide
diversity of non-government institutions, many of which would not have been
allowed to function either under the imperial or Derg regimes. The voluntary
sector now consists of professional societies, women's groups, human rights and
advocacy organizations, community organizations, indigenous and Northern NGOs,
employers' associations, educational foundations, think tanks, and cultural
societies. Old established institutions, which were dormant during the
repressive rule of the military government, are now more visible and more
active; a good example here is the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce. On the other
hand, trade unions, which are an important part of civil society, have been
effectively marginalized by heavy-handed government measures. A few examples may
provide an indication of the nature and diversity of associational activism in
the short period since the fall of the Derg. There are, for instance, some
twelve organizations engaged in human rights issues and civic advocacy. Their
activity ranges from monitoring human rights abuses, to protecting the rights of
women, to conducting civic education. Women's groups consist of a variety of
organizations established by women, including organizations of women lawyers,
women writers, women journalists, businesswomen, women's cultural groups, and
women's NGOs and advocacy groups. Community organizations are engaged in
cleaning up urban neighborhoods, promoting environmental sanitation, and
providing support to the homeless, street children and the needy.
There is a notable difference between the
voluntary sector during the imperial period and that of today. In the past,
non-government bodies consisted in the main of welfare organizations and mutual
aid societies which were chiefly concerned with providing support and sustenance
to their members and were thus essentially "inward oriented". The law of
association incorporated in the Civil Code of 1960 did not prohibit
public interest institutions -indeed the same law is employed today to register
voluntary organizations- but individuals at the time preferred to engage in
welfare activism because any other form of engagement was seen to be dangerous
and taken by the authorities as a form of criticism of the state. One may also
argue that these welfarist institutions served as "exit" options to individuals
who were overwhelmed by the dominant power of the state and who were unable to
engage it in any form. The Derg on the other hand suppressed almost all forms of
associational life except those having to do with customary institutions. In
contrast, while there are welfare organizations today, many of the institutions
established in the post-Derg period consist of social interest institutions
whose objective includes promoting the public interest and engaging the state in
one form or another for that purpose, though this has proved to be quite
difficult at the moment. These organizations may be described as "outward
oriented" because their mandate goes beyond the relatively narrow interest of
their members or constituencies and embraces issues of broad public concern.
There is very little serious
debate on civil society in Ethiopia today and the lacuna makes it impossible to
engage with the literature here. There are a limited number of works on the
voluntary sector but they are mostly about the activities of NGOs and their
unhappy relationship with the state (Campbell 1996; UNECA; van Diesen and Walker
1999). A recent work for the World Bank on civil society has nothing to say
about the voluntary sector outside the NGO community and is on the whole a
disappointing work (Clark 2000). I have discussed the nature and limitations of
some of the important civil society organizations in the country elsewhere and I
shall not repeat the arguments here (Dessalegn 2002). In this work, I divide
modern civil society institutions in Ethiopia into four broad categories. These
are: 1. Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). These consist of local or
international organizations engaged in relief, development or both. NGOs provide
services, channel funds, carry out development projects, but rarely engage in
advocacy work. 2. Advocacy organizations. These consist of rights-based
institutions and institutions committed to the protection of the environment,
wildlife,
etc.. In this category maybe included EHRCO, EWLA, APAP, LEM Ethiopia, FSS, and
others. 3. Interest groups. This refers to professional societies, trade unions,
cooperatives, Chambers of Commerce, Employers Associations, and cultural
societies. 4. Community organizations. In recent years the line dividing one
category from another is being blurred. A number of NGOs, for example are
becoming concerned about citizens’ rights, in particular the rights of
disadvantages groups. A number of traditional organizations, such as idirs,
for example, are beginning to shoulder many of the responsibilities of NGOs or
rights-based organizations and thereby changing themselves into modern civic
institutions.
I offer below a brief picture
of the activities of three of the more visible organizations that are products
of the post-Derg period (see Dessalegn forthcoming for details).
The two advocacy organizations which have attracted considerable public support
in the last four to five years are the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO),
and the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA). Established in 1991, shortly
after the fall of the Derg and the assumption of power by the present
government, EHRCO is the first human rights organization in the country. EHRCO
stress that it is a non-political organization committed to defending the rule
of law and the democratic process. One of its main activities is monitoring
human rights violations in the country and disseminating its findings to the
public by means of periodic reports detailing acts of unlawful imprisonment,
torture, extra-judicial killings, and violations of property rights. These
reports have had wide readership but they have angered the government which has
disputed the reports' accusations claiming that they are based on false evidence
and politically motivated. There was a concerted effort by the government to
silence EHRCO since the early days of the organization but without much success.
EHRCO does not provide legal assistance to the
public: it does not represent aggrieved persons in court nor offer legal advice
or support to those who may seek it. It is on the strength of its reports and
documentation that it hopes to achieve its main objective. Moreover, it has made
the rule of law and the democratic process a public issue requiring the active
concern of all citizens. This is no mean achievement given the country's culture
of governance and the tradition of successive governments of leaving the public
out of the political equation.
EHRCO has a local membership consisting of
academics, professionals and businessmen; it has support groups active in a
number of West European countries as well as in North America. It has
established links with such major international human rights bodies as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch. In terms of size of membership EHRCO may
appear small but it has succeeded in putting the democratic credentials of the
government under close scrutiny. Due in part to government hostility and
harassment, EHRCO's activity has until recently been confined to Addis Ababa and
its range of functions fairly limited.
EWLA was established in the mid-1990s by a
group of women lawyers to defend women's rights through the legal system, to
raise public awareness about the plight of women, and to agitate for reforms
promoting gender equality. Its main activities consist of legal aid to women,
public education and advocacy for legal reforms, and research and documentation.
The legal aid program, which is probably one of the most central of EWLA's
activities, provides a wide variety of legal advice and counseling to women,
including court representations by EWLA lawyers. The service is offered free of
charge to all that come seeking help. While the overwhelming majority of EWLA
clients are women, a few men have also sought legal aid, not for themselves but
on behalf of their female relatives. About 85 percent of the cases brought to
EWLA involve marital conflict, and the rest consist of rape, abduction, robbery
and theft, and assault and battery. Over 4000 women have received legal aid
since EWLA began the program in 1996; most of the women were from poor and
disadvantaged social backgrounds. Many of the women who came seeking EWLA
support heard about the organization either through EWLA's public education
program transmitted over the broadcast media, through word-of-mouth, or through
the organization's advertising campaign. EWLA has had some notable successes in
court and this has enhanced its stature among women.
EWLA has also invested considerable effort in
legislative reform. While the goal is to bring about the amendment of laws
discriminating against women, the main focus so far here has been on the reform
of the Family Law which was enacted in 1960 during the imperial regime and which
EWLA found especially discriminatory to women and a cause of much suffering by
women whose had marriage had broken up. Thanks in part to EWLA's persistent
campaign the law was finally reformed by Parliament in mid-2000.
It is too early to judge the impact of EWLA's activities on women and the policy
process. As far as its legal aid program is concerned, many women are now aware
that they can turn to EWLA if they feel they have been victims of gender-based
injustice. In this respect, it is filling an important gap and providing an
invaluable service. A recent EWLA publication states that in "those regions
where EWLA operates with full time staff … EWLA is almost a household name. The
offices have been enjoying tremendous public support and respect" (1999: 9). On
the other hand, it would be too much to expect a comparable success in its
effort to change public attitudes to women; such change may come about after
decades of struggle by women and their allies and through the instrumentality of
a vigorous and mass based feminist movement. With respect to legislative reform,
EWLA has a long and difficult task ahead of it.
There are, comparatively speaking, fewer
professional organizations in Ethiopia
than in many African countries, and this is obviously a reflection of the
greater underdevelopment of the country and the much lower level of
urbanization. The repressive environment of the past half-century has been
detrimental to the growth of associational life. Established in 1992 by a group
of distinguished Ethiopian economists, the Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA)
is arguably the most active and visible professional association in the county.
Like all other professional bodies, the advancement of the professional interest
of its members is an important objective of EEA, however the organization also
seeks to improve the quality of education in institutions of higher learning,
and to influence the process of economic policy making. Its monthly round table
debates bring together policy makers, academics, businessmen and interested
professionals to discuss topical economic issues and government policies related
to them. The forum regularly attracts a relative large audience, both economists
and non-economists, and is becoming an important fixture of the Addis Ababa
intellectual environment. The organization publishes a bimonthly bulletin in
which a limited number of articles appear in Amharic, and an English language
biannual journal. Most of the articles in these publications and the annual
conference proceedings are critical of the government's economic policy. There
is a strong concern among contributors and active members of the organization
that the economy is not showing any significant improvement, that an increasing
number of the population is facing severe poverty and hardship, and that the
country is being marginalized in the global market.
EEA's activities are confined to Addis Ababa,
and economists and others in the rest of the country have no opportunity of
participating in its programs. The organization does not promote a particular
school of economic thought; reflecting the diversity of its members, the views
expressed in its publications are eclectic and lacking in novelty and creative
adaptation. In common with economic bodies the world over, there is a strong
tendency to rely on quantitative methods, and limited theoretical debate on
broad development issues. As the president of the Association pointed out in his
address to the organization's seventh general assembly in 1999, there is no way
of knowing for certain whether EEA's efforts have made any impression on
economic policy making. It is evident that, at present, these efforts appear to
have made very little impact on decision-makers. He notes, however, that the
willingness of senior government officials to take part in the organization's
debating forum should be taken as a positive step in the right direction.
The growth of civil society institutions has
been greatly hampered by a variety of what may be called "external" and
"internal" constraints, the former referring to the policy environment, and the
latter to resource access and managerial capacity. The absence of a favorable
policy environment, which remains the most difficult to overcome at present, has
been responsible for restricting the terms of engagement of the voluntary sector
in Ethiopia. Indeed, through a variety of bureaucratic measures, the state has
succeeded in inhibiting the growth of civil society. The major "internal"
constraint has do with the lack of secure access to resources which includes
both funds and physical assets on the one hand, and competent human capital on
the other. Hence voluntary institutions are dependent on international donor
agencies, and, here as well as in other African countries, the private sector
plays only a marginal role in sustaining them.
At one level, we see little evidence that in
Ethiopia decision-makers as a body are willing to listen to the voluntary sector
or are ready to recognize that it has legitimate claims. Indeed, among some
government circles, civic institutions are still considered as part of the
political opposition and regarded with hostility. At another level, it is
evident that some of the advocacy groups have aroused public interest and are
attracting public support, though the "public" we are referring to is in the
main the Addis Ababa public. As noted earlier, for instance, EWLA's legal aid
service is actively sought by a good number of women who feel they have no other
recourse for redress of grievances. Thus despite their limited experience, civil
society institutions have made a modest impact on public attitudes.
Nevertheless, taken as a whole, civil society,
both here and elsewhere in Africa, is ineffectual, unsure of itself and
vulnerable. Thus, far from playing a determining role in political reforms and
the democratic process, civil society remains a marginal force and in no
position to influence decision-making; this is likely to continue for some time
in the future. The question now is: how is this failure or inadequacy to be
explained? At what point will civil society cease to be a marginal force and
begin to make its voice heard by public officials? When, in short, will it
become an effective catalyst for change?
Bayart has argued that civil society does not
exist in Africa because there are no homogenous societies and because of the
continuing prevalence of African autocracy. Civil society is the process by
which society confronts and counteracts the "totalisation" of the social sphere
by the state (1986). Bayart's view is unconvincing and the persistence of the
authoritarian tradition in the continent does not support his contention. A more
common argument is that civil society in Africa is nascent, in the process of
being formed, and, despite the growth of the voluntary sector, it will be a long
time before it can consolidate itself (see Kasfir: 1-20). This argument appears
convincing at first sight however closer examination raises a number of
troubling questions. There is consensus among students of Africa that societies
here are rich in associational life (see Bratton 1989), and that voluntarism is
central to traditional life. Why then, one may ask, has this voluntary culture
not transformed itself into a culture of civic engagement? On the other hand, it
is widely acknowledged that the independence movement in colonial
Africa
grew out of what on the surface appeared to be small, non-political, social
groups organized along traditional lines. Moreover, currently, strong trade
unions and farmers' organizations - which are part of civil society- are to be
found in a number of African countries, and yet they seem to be powerless to
resist the authoritarian bent of their governments.
A third argument is centered on the concept of
social capital, a concept that is attracting a good deal of interest and on
which there is a growing body of literature (Dasgupta and Serageldin 2000).
Social capital is premised on the assumption that society is composed of social
groups rather than individuals, and that such groups determine the individual's
values, attitudes and access to economic and other resources. Social capital is
a relational construct and therefore it is a public rather than a private good.
There are many shades of meaning attached to the term but most students of the
subject understand it to mean norms, trust and social networks embedded in
social organizations that enable the individuals to act together to achieve
their desired goals. Putnam and others have argued that communities with high
endowments of social capital are more likely to have a vigorous civil society
and to achieve democratic forms of governance and higher levels of economic
development.
Putnam is convinced that life is "easier in a country with substantial stock of
social capital" (1995). Although this view has not gone unchallenged (Narayan
1999), it continues to have wide currency.
To the question: why is a robust civil society
lacking in Africa? the proponents of social capital would answer that it is
because societies and social organizations here are not sufficiently endowed
with social capital. There is however a contradiction here because the
proponents themselves recognize that customary voluntary institutions rely to a
large extent on mutual trust, shared norms of conduct and reciprocity. James
Coleman, one of the earliest writers on the subject, cites rotating credit
associations, which are widespread in
Africa, as a good example of a
voluntary institution which has been successful because of the high level of
trust among its members (1990: Ch. 12).
In the Ethiopia setting (and this may well be
true in the broader African context), the notion of social capital provides only
a partial explanation of the problem we are examining because it is limited in
scope and because it fails to take into account the diverse causal relationships
that define the social environment. Moreover, the Ethiopian experience suggests
that social capital formation is not necessarily a precondition for civil
society but can occur in the process of civil society formation. The more civil
society organizations emerge the more social capital is formed. I submit however
that we need more research and more debate on the subject before we can attempt
a more conclusive analysis. Bearing this in mind, I suggest tentatively that
civil society organizations are weak and, in contrast, the power of the state
overwhelming because of the following factors:
Ø
there is low level of civic
voluntarism (or what I wish to call civic investment). Modern voluntary
institutions for the common good attract relatively few individuals because they
do not offer immediate benefits or satisfy individual needs. Many Ethiopians are
members of idir, for example, but few participate in civil society
institutions. Civic voluntarism goes hand in hand with social awareness.
Ø
there is low level of
institutional commitment. "Institutionalism" is low in the scale of social and
individual values, and there is not sufficient concern for creating and
sustaining civic institutions. Customary associations require much less
institutional capacity; they function on the basis of high personal trust
which is not the same thing as institutional trust.
Ø
poverty erodes trust and
reciprocity because of the intense competition for scarce resources. In fact,
material poverty gives rise to social poverty -a point that is often
ignored in the debate. Contrary to Narayan, I believe the environment of poverty
militates against the accumulation of social capital. Civil society
organizations thrive and civic solidarity is enhanced in conditions in which
there is a growing economy and rapid social change.
Ø
state-society interactions.
Relations between the state and the citizen are such that individuals are
unwilling to engage the state which in turn does not seek citizen participation.
Indeed, the relation between the two is a conflictual relation. There is no free
flow of information, and few avenues for citizen participation. In addition, the
capacity of the state to carry out its functions will have a bearing on the
nature of the social environment.
Civic voluntarism,
institutionalism, participation -and the list is not exhaustive- constitute
important elements of what I wish to call civic tradition, a concept that
is much more inclusive and less uni-dimensional than social capital. There is
thus a need to broaden the latter concept by integrating it into the framework
of the former. Civic tradition is much more than social capital formation: it
involves social awareness and civic responsibility. Trust and reciprocity may
rate high in the scale of values of business organizations, secret societies or
criminal gangs, but not necessarily among members of a civil rights or
environmental organization. Moreover, Putnam and others are wrong to assume that
all social groups with high stocks of social capital are likely to advance the
cause of the common good. The Mafia, for example, which is a close-knit social
organization relying on a high degree of trust and reciprocity among its
members, is not to my knowledge recognized as a champion of good governance and
democratization. One could also cite examples of communities endowed with social
capital but which continue to experience high levels of poverty, corruption and
conflict.
It is
evident that the difficulties facing civil society institutions in Ethiopia go
beyond a hostile policy environment, insufficient resources and inadequate
organizational capacity. What is missing in addition is a strong civic
tradition. The "deepening" of civil society that donors are keen to promote
becomes, in these circumstances, a complex undertaking and a long-term prospect.
This brings us to the second
important question raised earlier, namely when will civil society in Ethiopia
become a catalyst for change? The standard approach sees a direct link between
civil society and democratization, arguing that voluntary institutions are
important instruments for advancing the goals good governance. But we should
pose here a moment and examine the argument through the lens of contemporary
experience. The major political and social reforms in the West in the second
half of the twentieth century, such as those having to do with civil rights, the
environment and gender equality were a product of the complex interplay of mass
public pressure and the activism of social organizations and civic leaders.
Civil society institutions played a supportive role because they often helped to
define the issues more clearly for the public at large and to extend public
awareness. But in the end, these historic reforms would not have been possible
if they were not accompanied by sustained public pressure. We thus talk about
the civil rights movement, the environment and women's movement because it was
these citizens' (or civic) movements that brought about the reforms in
question. Civic movements such as these may be spearheaded by one or more social
organizations but they entail collective pressure brought to bear on governments
by a broad section of society and persisting in time and space. Civic movements
are nothing but public activism sustained over a sufficient period of
time. It is thus clear that democratic change is the combined outcome of the
persistent activism of the public and civil society institutions.
I am well aware of the pitfalls of transposing
the experiences of Western countries to an African setting but one cannot very
well ignore the lessons of the past. I submit therefore that in countries such
as Ethiopia, where there is little or no democratic tradition, political and
social reforms promoting good governance cannot be achieved without the combined
efforts of civic movements and voluntary organizations. In the absence of public
activism, however, which is what we have at present, the best contribution of
the voluntary sector is to raise public awareness. The link between civil
society and democratization is not, in our circumstances, a direct and intimate
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